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The Presidential A Faulty Process
Primary
Douglas A. Fraser and Irving Bluestone
The system ofpresidential primary elections has in effect created a nonsystemfor select-
ing party candidatesfor the highest office in the nation. Personality has become the sub-
stituteforprogram content, and campaign spending coupled with the influence ofthe
media countsfor more than the candidates ' experience, knowledge, expertise, administra-
tive ability, and attachment to the policies andprograms oftheir respective political party.
In large measure the current presidential primary system has failed in its objective to
advance the democratic process within the political parties while undermining the effec-
tiveness ofthe parties and the importance ofactivists, the party regulars. It is altogether
fair to allege that the democratic values we cherish as a nation are not being reinforced by
the primary system. This article proposes that we reexamine the processfor selecting each
party 's presidential candidate in search ofa better way.
It is altogether timely to reexamine the primary election process in the selection of polit-
ical party presidential candidates and to pose the question, Does the current presiden-
tial primary system truly represent the essence of democracy and its values, or is it a
procedure that is claimed to be valid in theory but is actually defective in practice? Our
judgment holds that it is, indeed, defective in practice. We must either design revisions
and reforms that will make it a more effective and efficient system or perhaps find a sub-
stitute for it altogether.
The ostensible purpose of a primary election is to ensure that each party's candidate for
president is selected by popular vote of the party's adherents among the citizenry at large.
However, the election campaign, inevitably, emerges as a popularity contest among indi-
viduals rather than the selection of candidates based on a comprehensive examination by
the voters of a broad range of salient socioeconomic issues. The contest tends to be more a
matter of charismatic personality than of program content. It appears to be more a matter
of which candidates can raise the most money for their respective campaign than it is the
value of each individual's experience, knowledge, expertise, creative thinking, adminis-
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trative ability, and attachment to the policies and programs of his or her political party.
And the influence of the media, particularly television, seems to accentuate the allure of
the candidates' appearance far more than the substance of the issues they advocate. In
some considerable measure, moreover, the primary referendum has tended to undermine
the significance of the political party as the standard-bearer of its political platform and
advocate in behalf of its committed members. Add to these distractions the extended dura-
tion of the presidential primary campaign, the strain and stress of demands on one's en-
durance on the campaign trail, the inequities of influence on the voters arising from the
calendar of state primaries, the low state of voter participation, and the need for candi-
dates already holding public office to neglect their duties during the long months of cam-
paigning.
The question properly arises: Are the democratic values we cherish as a nation being
reenforced by the use of the current system of presidential primaries or is it time to review
the process, revise it, or even find an appropriate substitute that will correct its defects?
Let us first examine the past record of facts and figures surrounding the presidential pri-
mary in order to highlight the arguments concerning its inadequacies.
The Money Problem
In a March 10, 1988, editorial, the New York Times commented on the result of the Super
Tuesday, March 8, 1988, primary for presidential candidates with the caption "The Shock
of Super Tuesday"' The Super Tuesday primary elections gained that title because of the
large number of states which scheduled their primary election to be held on that one day.
Why did the editorial describe the result as "shocking"?
Because it brought us face to face with the beast: a sudden quantum jump in the need
for money. No disrespect for the candidates' other qualities, but please notice that
those who had lots of money to spend, like Bush, Gore and Dukakis, won on Tuesday;
those who didn't, like Dole and Gephardt, lost.
Well, that's right, but where's the shock? Everyone knows "money is the mother's
milk of politics."
It is indeed rare that the candidate with the most money to spend during the primary
campaign is the one who loses. It is rarer still that the candidate who has the least amount
of money to spend is the one who wins, regardless of capability and qualifications to lead
the nation.
The number of dollars collected and spent has reached proportions that probably re-
quire more time and effort during the campaign than do study and research of the key
issues and preparation by the candidate and staff to define a vision for the nation's future
well-being and formulate an action program to solve the nation's problems.
In the presidential primary campaign of 1983-1984, eleven candidates entered the
race.
2 A total of $105 million was collected, of which $24.6 million were federal matching
funds, and $103.6 million were actually disbursed. 3 It may be assumed that the rest of the
money remained unexpended in that campaign. Since President Reagan was the only
Republican Party candidate in the race, the outlay of $25.9 million for his campaign was
comparatively small. Obviously, had Reagan not been an incumbent and unchallenged,
the expenditures would have been dramatically higher. For instance, in the 1979-1980
presidential primary campaign, there was a total often candidates, four for the Demo-
cratic Party and six for the Republican Party, and while the total outlay of campaign funds
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amounted to $92.3 million, the Republican candidates received $56.7 million, more than
double the $25.9 million spent when Reagan ran unopposed.
The 1987-1988 presidential primary saw an explosion of spending in behalf of the can-
didates. As compared with the $103.6 million disbursed in 1983-1984 and the $92.
3
million spent in 1979-1980, the net disbursements in the 1987-1988 race totaled
$250,361 ,270. 4 This represents an increase of more than 100 percent in expenditures over
the preceding presidential primary. One might speculate how much higher the figure will
be in future such primaries. In other words, how high is up?
It is also of interest to note that the candidates who received the most in contributions
and spent the most for the campaign in contested elections were the winners: Dukakis and
Bush in 1987-1988 and Mondale in 1983-1984; Reagan and Carter in 1979-1980.
In a Senate race a William Proxmire, as an admittedly rare exception, may be the victor,
yet not spend gobs of money in the campaign. It is extremely doubtful, even impossible,
that a candidate without substantial financing would be able to make any kind of showing,
let alone win, in a presidential primary contest.
It is evident that money talks and is heard. Does it also mean that the most qualified,
capable, and experienced is selected? Good question.
The Voter Turnout Problem
The United States has become infamous among industrial democracies for its low voter
participation, both in the so-called off-year elections and in presidential election years as
well. In the 1960 presidential election, 62.8 percent of the voting-age population went to
the polls; that year stands as the high-water mark of voter turnout over the past thirty
years. Thereafter, a rather steady decline has taken place (except for a minimal upturn of
one-half a percentage point to 53. 1 percent in 1984) so that in the 1988 election participa-
tion fell to a low of 50.2 percent. George Bush was elected president by 53.4 percent of
those who went to the polls. He received 48.8 million votes — a mere 26.8 percent of the
182.6 million total number of eligible voters. And this election was for the presidency, not
just to choose a candidate for the office!
Voter participation in the presidential primaries is, of course, considerably lower than
that in the presidential election itself. In the 1988 primaries, not a single state came any-
where near a 50 percent total turnout. In fact Montana, with 35.5 percent of its eligible
voters going to the polls, enjoyed the highest voter turnout. In most of the states that held a
primary, the voter turnout was below 30 percent; in Rhode Island it was a bare 8.5 percent. 5
Thus, in a primary with five or six contestants, a candidate may garner sufficient con-
vention votes to win the presidential nomination yet his or her actual vote from among the
eligible citizens may represent a minuscule percentage of the voting-age population who
support his or her party. Consider, for example, that in 1988 Rhode Island had 764,000
eligible voters for the primary election. Only 16,000 participated in the Republican pri-
mary, representing 2.1 percent of the voting-age population. This may be democracy in
theory, but there must be a better way to make it more meaningful.
It is of more than passing interest to note that the steady decline in the percentage of
eligible voters who actually exercise their franchise in presidential elections coincides
with the proliferation of presidential primary elections. It may not be possible objectively
to attribute this phenomenon to the increase in the use of primaries to select nominees
for the presidency. It would appear, however, that the almost permanent presidential
campaigning with its constant beat of media coverage generates more voter apathy than it
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does voter participation. Perhaps the voters are so weary of such uninterrupted primary
campaigning that they are "turned off" by what they rapidly come to consider a more or
less vapid performance. No less a political guru than Lee Atwater, the brain behind the
1988 Bush campaign, expressed the opinion that many voters simply "don't feel that
voting is a rational use of their time."
The Crossover Problem
Another factor that compounds the problem of choosing a party's candidate in a primary
is the "crossover" vote. It is possible for supporters of the Republican Party to vote in the
Democratic Party primary, and vice versa. Thus, it is not mere speculation to project a
situation in which adherents of one party pose as supporters of the opposing party in the
primary and cast ballots for an admittedly weak candidate in an effort to thwart the cam-
paign of a strong one. Such a deliberate action has the earmarks of a "dirty tricks" cam-
paign, but dirty tricks are certainly not outside the pale of political morality. Just consider
the nature of some recent campaign tactics.
Yet another area of concern might be considered. Apparently nothing prevents anyone
from running for office as a Democrat or a Republican — or as an independent. All that is
necessary is to declare one's candidacy and enter the primary of either party. One would
expect that the sincerity of declared party adherence might be subject to scrutiny by the
party itself. In the 1990 Massachusetts primary election, John Silber, who admitted to
having voted for Ronald Reagan in 1980 and 1984 and for George Bush in 1988, was the
winning candidate for governor in the Democratic Party primary. There are strong indica-
tions that his victory was attributable to voters who registered as independents but cast
Democratic ballots for Silber in the primary election. It therefore appears that the adher-
ents to the Democratic Party did not determine who would be the standard-bearer for their
own political party.
Or consider the senatorial candidate in Louisiana, David Duke, the former Ku Klux
Klan leader. It is scandalous that he ran as a Republican even though GOP officials dis-
avowed him and his campaign, which was strikingly, unabashedly, and explicitly racist.
Should there be a procedure that enables the official political party to exercise some
measure of control in determining the eligibility of a potential candidate? Should a person
whose pronouncements and stated positions are diametrically opposed to the principles,
policies, and programs of the party he or she wishes to represent be prevented from enter-
ing a primary race? In all fairness, should not those who are registered as
supporters of their chosen party decide who should be the candidate of their party? It is
perhaps easier to raise the questions than to determine the answers. The questions them-
selves, however, are certainly pertinent.
The Calendar Problem
For some years political scientists, officials of the two major parties, and elected officials
have been mulling over developments related to the scheduling of primaries in the various
states. The early timing of primary voting in Iowa and New Hampshire has been a matter
of considerable debate. Although these are comparatively small states in terms of popula-
tion (and their people are not demographically typical of the broad culture of the nation as
a whole), their scheduled primaries appear to have carried lopsided weight in influencing
subsequent primary elections in other states. Thus, the winners in these two states have a
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psychological advantage as the campaign presses on into other areas of the nation. It is a
reflection of the advantage attached to being a winner without necessarily evaluating the
significance or lack of significance of these early contests within the context of the na-
tional scene of all the fifty states. New Hampshire sends only eighteen delegates to the
Democratic Party national convention. For the candidates, the importance of that primary
rests mainly on the opportunity to gain national publicity. It helps to win these delegates,
but they are a tiny fraction of the several thousand who attend the convention.
In 1984, and even more notably in 1988, with a view toward pressing the full weight of
the southern region of the nation onto the selection of candidates, the southern and border
states agreed to schedule their primaries on the same day chosen by six states outside the
South, creating Super Tuesday. The purpose, ostensibly, was to consolidate the South 's
voting strength and diminish the influence of the Iowa and New Hampshire primaries.
Holding a multiple-state primary on one day makes it virtually impossible for candi-
dates personally to cover all the areas in the short period of time allotted. Under the strain
and stress of campaigning, how can any candidate possibly visit twenty states on a hop,
skip, and jump basis to bring his or her message to the electorate? Reliance on TV com-
mercials and newspaper advertisements, therefore, becomes the substitute for in-person.
hands-on appearances. Money again becomes the key. In any event, prospective voters
receive a fleeting thirty-second TV commercial that carries little of substance and relies
perceptibly on unadorned deception to influence the audience.
On the one hand, then, is the issue of undue influence generated by a couple of early
primaries. On the other is the problem of a simultaneous date for several primaries that
makes personal campaigning impossible. The pros and cons of the debate over scheduling
of primaries remain a hot issue. Should the primaries be staggered over a longer period of
time? Should one day be singled out for a super national primary? The discussion con-
tinues, with no finite answer in sight.
The Media Problem
How much or how little influence the media have on the voters' selection of a presidential
candidate has been a subject of considerable interest to political scientists, politicians, and
the media themselves. On one side are those who insist that the election results prove that
media hype for an early front-runner in the primary elections has negligible effect on the
ultimate choice of the candidates. An examination of Ted Kennedy's defeat by Jimmy
Carter in 1980 and Ronald Reagan's victory over George Bush after Bush's early Iowa
win have been cited, as has the poor showing of John Glenn in 1984 despite a heavy bar-
rage of early favorable media coverage. 6 The other side of the argument is that the media
dominate and fashion the character of the campaign. So it is not unusual to find this con-
clusion from a research study of the subject:
In the absence of strong party machines that inform and mobilize the electorate, the
news media have become increasingly important in the prenomination phase of the
presidential selection process. From one perspective — applying the criteria of news-
worthiness to large, multicandidate fields — it can be argued that they are now the
essential institutional force in the process. Through both the quantity and the quality
of press coverage the candidates receive, critical judgments are fashioned by political
elites, likely voters, and other less active members of the electorate. These include
decisions about contributing time and money as well as about whether to vote and
for whom. 7
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In fact, it is argued that candidates will increasingly cater to the needs of the media,
recognizing the overriding importance of utilizing them to further campaigns. Thus:
Candidates who understand the ways of the press and the institutional and personal
needs of media professionals can increase the probability of receiving coverage by
facilitating the job of reporters. Implementation of such a strategy frequently depends
on the campaign's ability to organize and schedule activities to fit the deadlines of the
press. This is increasingly done with an eye toward the production needs or demands
of the evening news, and it frequently includes production of "pseudo-events" or
"medialities." This means attempting to schedule major events no later than lunch or
early afternoon, arranging for good crowds, and distributing prepared copies of the
text, if there is one, in advance. For television, it means arranging a setting with ap-
propriate visuals that will generate videotape with good pictures that can be used on
the air. 8
In this modern age of telecommunication, the TV screen "has become the central me-
dium of communication in modern politics" and even facial expressions and postural
habits of the candidates as their image comes on screen influence viewers' attitudes and
opinions. 9 Little surprise, therefore, that the public relations and communications experts
have come to play an increasingly dominant role in fashioning the candidates' campaigns.
Issues per se tend to receive less attention than the candidates' expressive displays, care-
fully rehearsed in advance of TV appearances.
Willy-nilly, the media, in print, and even more so in TV, play a notable role in the elec-
tion process, but that role has less to do with the major issues on the national and interna-
tional scene than with the thirty-second-spot portrayal of personality and the cleverly
manipulated use of the media by the candidate. The political party, its policies and pro-
gram, the party leaders, and the party activists have a diminishing role in the final choice
of the presidential candidate, the potential standard-bearer for the party. Put more bluntly,
as one observer of the primary election process concluded, "The problem is that televi-
sion created a process that has weakened the parties and created one of the least well-
organized systems for choosing party leaders in the world." 10
The Wear-and-Tear Problem
It is a wonder that a presidential candidate who campaigns from the beginning of the con-
test for nomination and sticks it out to the final decision does not collapse from exhaus-
tion. No other nation in the world in which democratic and contested elections are held
makes the stamina demands upon the candidates that the United States does. For almost
two years — and in some cases longer— the candidate is on the run, rushing from one
geographic location to another, meeting with staff, meeting with small groups of the polit-
ically or financially powerful, appearing before audiences of supporters, shaking hands,
engaging in the proverbial kissing of babies, fencing with the press, and looking fresh and
engaging for the news and television cameras. Grabbing a sandwich or a brief nap while
on the run between appearances is common practice, in the tradition of Harry Truman,
whose advice was never to pass up a "facility" because one never knows when the next
one will be available.
Most presidential primary candidates already hold elective office. The demands of
campaigning make it difficult — almost impossible — to perform one's functions and
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fulfill one's responsibilities as a "job holder" while pursuing the campaign trail. There
is no leave of absence with or without pay for a senator or a member of Congress or a
governor. A governor is still responsible for governing and should not neglect his or her
ongoing duties. A senator or congressman should still serve actively on congressional
committees, study the bills to be voted on, and be present to cast a vote. The balancing act
between trying to win the nomination for president and resisting neglect of their job func-
tions places further strain on an already taut string. One need only reflect on the problems
that Governor Dukakis and the citizens of Massachusetts have faced since the November
1988 election to realize how difficult it is to manage an extended presidential primary
campaign and a governor's duties simultaneously.
Such months-long campaigning is a grueling exercise that, often enough, leads to the
use of a quick quip rather than intensive presentation of salient issues. And the stretched-
out primary process is only the beginning for the candidate who captures the nomination
at the party's national convention. After an all too brief rest comes preparation for TV
debates and the fifty-state rush-rush pace of the presidential campaign itself. When one
considers the strains and stresses of extended campaigning on the candidate, the family,
and the staff, compounded by the humiliating need constantly to beg for money to finance
the operation, it is little wonder that otherwise viable, even outstanding, candidates are
inhibited from taking the plunge. And little wonder that, for those who do make the run.
"Read my lips" becomes the campaign substitute for a careful, studied exposition of the
issues and solutions to the nation's problems! Dreaming up gimmickry and calling up
charisma are all too often becoming the essence of presidential campaigning.
Is There a Satisfactory Answer?
Inherent in the debate concerning the presidential primary election system lies the funda-
mental issue of democracy and democratic values. Until the end of the nineteenth century
the national party conventions comprised delegates selected directly by state party leaders
or by activists voting in state party caucuses. The reaction to "boss control" of the proc-
ess, which entered internal party procedures in the early years of the twentieth century,
led to the introduction of state primaries. In fact, in 1916 both the national Democratic
and Republican parties used the primary in twenty states to select delegates to their re-
spective national conventions. It was not long, however, before the use of the presidential
primary fell into disrepute and the caucus method was essentially reinstated.
The upheaval of the 1960s, and particularly the debacle of the 1968 Democratic national
convention in Chicago, saw the rise of internal party reform movements. The primary
election process inherited new vigor with the cry of democracy and direct participation
aimed at wresting party control from "party bosses." Today only sixteen states, plus
Washington, DC. , do not hold presidential primaries. However, just as the primary elec-
tion process again came under review in the 1920s, so today is soul-searching taking place
concerning the current system of presidential primaries.
The basic issue remains: Is the present presidential primary system fulfilling its prom-
ise of true political democracy or has it simply become a "nonsystem"? Should the parties
revert to the preprimary election system for selecting delegates to their respective national
conventions? Or should they put in place carefully directed reforms of the present system
aimed at correcting deficiencies and ensuring the protection of democratic values within
our free society?
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The Role of Activists in National Party Conventions
Throughout the nation as a whole, tens of thousands of rank-and-file citizens are activists
within their respective parties. They attend party meetings in their communities, pay dues
to help maintain party apparatus, become precinct delegates, perform volunteer duties in
party offices, involve themselves in congressional district races, and so forth. There is
every reason for them to play a meaningful role in the selection of their party's candidate
for president. In the present primary selection system, however, that role, while not to-
tally obliterated, is largely devitalized. Inevitably this leads to a weakening of the party
apparatus and the decline of the party as a political force.
Yet the candidate who wins the nomination through the primary process runs under the
banner of his or her party. The reaction in past years to party "bossism," with a handful of
powerful leaders within the party ruling the roost in selecting presidential candidates in
the confines of the traditional smoke-filled room, was aimed at democratizing the proc-
ess. As some critics have noted, the result has become a nonsystem. And it has tended
to eviscerate the influence of the broad base of regulars whose devotion to its principles
is evidenced by their consistent involvement in the ongoing activities of the party of
their choice.
A political party, after all, should be comprised of political activists rallying around
common policy goals. It should be representative of a strong association of people whose
combined commitment and force are aimed at convincing the electorate at large that their
cause is just and deserves the support of the voters.
Why not, then, create a presidential nominating system that reflects the significant
contribution of party activists and provides them with the opportunity to select their
leader? After all, they are better acquainted with the qualities and capabilities of prospec-
tive candidates. They represent, by and large, the core of party support and influence
party policy. There is no reason why a process should not be established that would avoid
authoritarian total party boss control and recognize the democratizing value of the broad-
based rank-and-file activist role in choosing the party's presidential nominee. Theodore
Roosevelt, Woodrow Wilson, Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Harry Truman, Dwight
Eisenhower, John F. Kennedy, and Lyndon Johnson were the nominees — and ultimately
the successful candidates — for their respective parties. And their selection was, in the
greatest measure, the decision by party activists in open convention.
The deficiencies in the current system of presidential primaries appear increasingly
obvious. It is desirable, even necessary, therefore, to effect a deserved major role for party
activists with an appropriate voting opportunity of the electorate in the ultimate selection of
the respective party's presidential nominee at each party's national convention.
This is not to advocate a reversion to pure party bossism. It is to say, however, that a
fitting substitute for a disjointed primary presidential election system would be a carefully
designed process to ensure the democratizing input in the nominee selection procedure by
those whose serious and consistent attachment to the party of their choice earns for them
the status of knowledgeable delegates to their party's national convention. The fulfillment
of democracy rests upon the implementation of democratic processes. It is not undemo-
cratic to establish a system of decision making in which those who have devoted their
time, energy, and active participation in the affairs of their chosen political party attend
the "caucus" — the national convention — in which, after due and ample debate, their
vote designates their representative.
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This requires a process which assures that such party adherents become convention
delegates with voting rights. An appropriate process to achieve this goal becomes readily
apparent. The practice of electing precinct captains within the two major political parties
is one of long standing. It affords the opportunity for those who wish to represent their
chosen party to solicit the votes of the citizens in their precinct who are registered in their
respective party to become the party's representatives at the neighborhood level of the
thousands of the nation's apportioned precincts.
These precinct delegates, the grassroots activists, comprise the core of each party's
congressional district meetings. It is altogether reasonable that this group select the peo-
ple to represent their congressional district at the party's national convention. Moreover,
at each of the party's state conventions the same group would confirm the congressional
district selections of national convention delegates and select a designated number of at-
large delegates. These latter would be chosen from among the state party leaders and the
party's elected public officials. It is of course a given that the members of the national
committee of the party and members of Congress would also be confirmed as delegates.
The number of delegates to the national convention from each state would be apportioned
on the basis of the census population in the state. Thus, the voting strength of each state at
the convention would reflect the precise proportion of its population to the total popula-
tion of the nation.
These delegates, because of their interest and involvement in their party's affairs and
the time, energy, and commitment they devote to party activities, are in a position to
assess the qualifications of possible presidential candidates and to evaluate the likely
chances of each potential nominee to win the election.
It stands to reason that such a selection process would gain the advantage for each party
of more or less guaranteeing that the chosen candidate is carefully scrutinized as to quali-
ties of required leadership appropriately reflecting the policies and programs of the party.
The choice by the voting public is, as a consequence, far more apt to be based on an as-
sessment of the nominees' stand on the key national and international issues than on catch
phrases and negative election campaigning.
There is still, however, the question of the self-starter who "catches fire" prior to the
nominating convention itself. A convention that totally ignores such a new political star
does so at its and its party's peril. Assuredly, an individual who is affiliated with a party
and wishes to be considered for the presidential nomination, whether well known or a
veritable newcomer, should have the opportunity to "sell" his or her "wares," so to
speak, and attempt to prove that he or she can generate the support needed to win. This
was the case in 1960, when John F. Kennedy swept the presidential primary in West Vir-
ginia and ran in the other fifteen primaries held that year. He captured the imagination of
the voters, overcame what many considered a drawback in the national political scene, his
Catholicism, and lit the torch that carried him to his party's nomination and his election to
the presidency.
To prevent foreclosure of such a possibility and to cause serious consideration to be
given to such a candidate, it would be reasonable to retain the primary election but to
adjust it so as to minimize to the greatest degree the faults and failings of the current sys-
tem. It might be sensible for each party to schedule a limited number of state primaries —
perhaps ten in all — determined to be generally representative of the various geographic
and demographic sectors of the nation. There would have to be severe time constraints on
the primary election schedule effectively to avoid the drawn-out, exhausting process.
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Moreover, in each succeeding presidential election year a different grouping of states
would be designated to comprise the primary population so that the results of early pri-
maries would not unduly or unfairly influence the outcome in other states.
Some candidates may, at their own risk, decide not to enter the primaries. They would
nevertheless be entitled to seek their party's nomination. Recall, for instance, the success
of Adlai Stevenson in 1952 and 1956. Even though Estes Kefauver won the primaries,
which Stevenson chose not to enter, the Democratic convention delegates selected Steven-
son as their nominee, convinced that his were the superior qualifications.
With a combination of activist delegates selected from within the party structure and
delegates reflecting the results of a limited number of primaries, all the prospective candi-
dates would have a chance to air their views, a dark horse candidates would have his or her
moment in the spotlight, and the candidate of choice would be one whose carefully
weighed credentials make that person a potential winner for the party.
Political Party Rules
There is every reason for the political parties, within the confines of their structure and
responsive to their policies, to establish rules, regulations, and procedures governing the
campaigns undertaken by their respective candidates. For example, rules might be estab-
lished concerning "dirty tricks" campaigning, with the precautionary note that candi-
dates who violate those rules will be publicly chastised by party officials. More precisely,
all thirty-second TV commercials would require the candidate in whose behalf the mes-
sage is delivered to take full responsibility for its content by either personally introducing
it or confirming it at the close.
It certainly would be helpful for the media to publicize untruths or falsifications by or in
behalf of any candidate. It may not be feasible to compel the media to present such analy-
ses, but sound reporting surely calls for objective, factual correction of false statements or
innuendo. The Willie Horton commercials of the 1988 Bush campaign come readily to
mind.
It would also be necessary to guard against the "crossover" vote in any primary. It is
fair and fitting that only those registered as Republicans be permitted to vote in the Re-
publican Party primary and only those registered as Democrats to vote in the Democratic
Party primary. It would be altogether fitting if a national law were enacted requiring the
declaration of political party preference as a prerequisite to vote in a particular primary.
After all, the primary is the business of the political party, and its results should reflect
the will only of those who are declared party supporters. A Michigan law enacted in 1988
required voters in that state to declare a party preference in order to be eligible to vote in
the presidential primary. Its admitted purpose was to prevent the crossover vote. In May
1990 a circuit court judge declared that the law was a violation of the state constitution.
The basis for the decision was that the law violated the provision requiring only state
residency as a license to vote. Surely it makes eminent good sense that only those who are
declared adherents of a particular party be eligible to vote in the party's primary. In fact,
in a 1981 Wisconsin case, the court held that each political party has the right to decide
how delegates to its national nominating convention are selected."
The thesis presented here is to give preference to a system in which party activists have
the major role in selecting the nominee in national party conventions yet not totally aban-
doning the role of a limited number of primary elections in providing the opening for a
32
self-starter to prove his or her electability. There is much to be argued in favor of having
those most committed to and knowledgeable concerning the party and its possible presi-
dential candidates as the decision makers. Admittedly, times and circumstances may make
this change difficult to achieve, for the transition from the current presidential primary
election process would not be easy. It is urgent, nonetheless, that party activists and the
parties themselves play the vital and weighty role in the nominee selection process. After
all, it is they who have devoted the time, effort, energy, and financial investment to keep
their organizations healthy and vibrant. Perhaps it is stretching a point, but if only share-
holders may vote to determine the management of corporate enterprises, why should not
the stakeholder activists in political parties have the significant and influential voice in
selecting their presidential nominees?
The approach advocated does not entirely lay to rest some of the problems troubling the
current system, such as undue media influence. It does, however, argue for sharp change
in the current nonsystem of the presidential primary election process. The time is ripe.
The will to change must be strongly nurtured so that a more rational system can become a
reality.^
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